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Abstract 
The COVID-19 pandemic has been an ideal breeding ground for conspiracy theories. Yet, 
different beliefs could have different implications for individuals’ emotional responses, 
which in turn could relate to different behaviours and specifically to either a greater or lesser 
compliance with social distancing and health protective measures. In the present research, we 
investigated the links between COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs, emotions (anger, anxiety, and 
hope), attitudes towards government restrictions, and self-reported compliant behaviour. 
Results of a cross-sectional survey amongst a large UK sample (N = 1,579) provided support 
for the hypothesis that COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs showed a polarising relationship with 
compliant behaviour through opposing emotional pathways. The relation was mediated by 
higher levels of anger, itself related to a lesser perceived importance of government 
restrictions, and simultaneous higher levels of anxiety, related to a greater perceived 
importance. Hope was also related to conspiracy beliefs and to greater perceived importance 
but played a weaker role in the mediational model. Results suggest that the behavioural 
correlates of conspiracy beliefs might not be straightforward, and highlight the importance of 
considering the emotional states such beliefs might elicit, when investigating their potential 
impact. 
Keywords: COVID-19; conspiracy theory beliefs; emotions; compliance. 
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COVID-19 conspiracy theories and compliance with governmental restrictions: The 
mediating roles of anger, anxiety, and hope 
 
At the end of 2019 a viral outbreak in Wuhan, China, evolved from a regional health 
crisis to a global pandemic (Sohrabi et al., 2020). Since then, Sars-CoV-2, commonly referred 
to as COVID-19, has changed the lives of citizens around the globe. Measures to control the 
pandemic have influenced how people interact with each other, and have caused significant 
economic uncertainty (Fornaro & Wolf, 2020). Events of such magnitude are intuitively 
assigned causes of proportional significance (Leman & Cinnirella, 2007), and in the absence 
of an official account for the source of the virus as of today (World Health Organization, 
2021), the coronavirus pandemic has proven to be the ideal breeding ground for conspiracy 
theories (Douglas, 2021). Indeed, conspiracy theories tend to flourish in times of crisis and 
uncertainty, and the pandemic seems no exception (van Prooijen & Douglas, 2017). One such 
conspiracy theory supposes that the virus was manufactured in China as a bioweapon to be 
used against the West. Another supposes that the virus is all a hoax. Yet another supposes that 
the rollout of 5G technology is somehow linked to COVID-19. These conspiracy theories 
have been widespread on social media (Allington et al., 2020), have been regularly covered 
by mainstream news (Spring, 2020) and have sometimes even been endorsed by people in 
high office (Beer, 2020).  
Emerging theorising and research suggests that these conspiracy theories could have 
serious consequences for how the public responds to COVID-19 (Van Bavel et al., 2020). 
Conspiracy beliefs have already been linked to lower compliance with social distancing and 
other health protective measures, including vaccination (e.g., Bertin et al., 2020; 
Bierwiaczonek et al., 2020; Earnshaw et al., 2020). However, COVID-19 conspiracy theories 
differ in important ways. Specifically, some conspiracy theories downplay the severity of the 
virus, whereas others augment it. Belief in these different conspiracy theories could therefore 
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have different implications for individuals’ perceptions of threat, their emotional responses, 
and subsequent behaviour. Specifically, some conspiracy beliefs may be associated with 
decreased feelings of threat and hence public compliance with social distancing and health 
protective measures, whereas others might be associated with improvements in such 
responses. Yet, little is known about the psychological processes through which conspiracy 
beliefs translate into personal behaviour. In the present research, we looked at the relationship 
between belief in conspiracy theories (general and COVID-19 related), attitudes towards 
government restrictions, and self-reported compliant behaviour. More specifically, we 
investigated the roles of specific emotions (anger, anxiety and hope) as potential mediators of 
these links.  
Conspiracy Theories and Behaviour during the COVID-19 Pandemic 
Adherence to government policies and public health advice is considered crucial in 
efforts to control the spread of COVID-19 (Islam et al., 2020). Compliance with restrictive 
policies will partly depend on whether citizens deem them appropriate, and this in part 
depends on how dangerous citizens believe the virus to be (Lalot et al., 2021). Conspiracy 
theories associated with people’s perceptions of the virus could then impact compliance with 
government policies and recommendations. A growing body of research has identified links 
between conspiracy beliefs and lower compliance with governmental restrictions (notably 
with lockdown rules, Marinthe et al., 2020; Oleksy et al., 2021), lesser adoption of health 
protective behaviours, and lower intentions to get vaccinated (e.g., Allington et al., 2020; 
Biddlestone et al., 2020; Bierwiaczonek et al., 2020; Earnshaw et al., 2020; Imhoff & 
Lamberty, 2020). It seems that the negative impact of conspiracy theories on compliance is at 
least partly explained by a decrease in trust in both the government (Pavela Banai et al., 2020) 
and in health authorities, and more generally science (Plohl & Musil, 2021; Rutjens et al., 
2021).  
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However, other studies have found that conspiracy beliefs predict higher compliance 
with governmental restrictions. Marinthe et al. (2020) investigated the links between general 
conspiracy beliefs and different health behaviours. In one study they found that conspiracy 
beliefs were associated with greater preventive health behaviour (i.e., following government 
advice on personal contact as well as following self-imposed social distancing rules), at least 
as long as participants were afraid of personal contamination or death due to the virus (i.e., 
when they thought the risk was high). Similarly, Imhoff and Lamberty (2020) found that some 
conspiracy beliefs related to more cautious behaviour (i.e., stocking up on food). 
Taken together, these studies suggest that the relationships between conspiracy 
beliefs and social behaviours are by no means uniform. On the contrary, belief in COVID-19 
conspiracy theories seem to correlate with responses that reflect different evaluations of the 
seriousness of the pandemic: either that the danger is overstated (e.g., hoax beliefs) or that the 
danger is understated (e.g., bioweapon or government take-over beliefs). To capture this 
ambiguity, the present study used a general statement reflecting COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs 
(i.e., whether official authorities “hide the truth about COVID-19”). Such a single-item 
measure makes it more likely that respondents focus on aspects and information on this issue 
that are relevant to them and ignore other aspects (for similar considerations, see e.g., Nagy, 
2002). We anticipated that this would allow respondents to interpret the statement in 
accordance with their own type of conspiracy belief and that the measure could elicit a 
stronger agreement amongst people with different evaluations of the pandemic.  
Crucially, the different evaluations should relate to different attitudes, emotional 
states, and behaviours with regard to official government guidelines. More specifically, 
people who believe in a conspiracy deeming the virus non-existent or harmless would be 
more likely to disregard containment-related behaviours. On the other hand, people who 
believe that the pandemic is more dangerous than authorities acknowledge should be 
particularly cautious and engage in more health behaviours. We propose in the current 
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research that emotions are a relevant psychological process to account for such effects of 
conspiracy beliefs. Specifically, we propose that different positive and negative emotions 
(related to perceptions of the pandemic as more or less serious and threatening) will help to 
explain whether and how conspiracy beliefs relate to compliance.  
The Role of Emotions 
A large body of research recognises the key role of affective processes in 
determining collective action and more broadly social behaviour (e.g., Drouvelis & 
Grosskopf, 2016; Marcus, 2003; van Zomeren, 2013; Wlodarczyk et al., 2017). Several fields 
of research, from health psychology to media and political communication research, also 
highlight how emotions conveyed in news, the media, or simply persuasion messages, can 
translate into important attitude and behaviour change. These effects of emotions can prove 
complex (see e.g., Chaiken et al., 1989; Konijn, 2013; Wirth & Schramm, 2005; Witte & 
Allen, 2000). In the context of COVID-19, there is already evidence that people’s affective 
responses (notably through risk assessment and resulting levels of anxiety versus quietness) 
relate to their behaviour in the face of the pandemic (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2020; Marinthe et 
al., 2020). We focus here specifically on three affective responses: anger, anxiety, and hope. 
The sections below present these emotions in turn and their theorised role in the link between 
conspiracy beliefs and COVID-19 compliant behaviour.  
Anger 
Anger is a negative, arousing, action-oriented emotion that leads people to tackle the 
obstacles preventing them to achieve their goals. In the broader social context, anger urges 
people to confront perceived threats and injustices (Lambert et al., 2019; van Zomeren, 2013). 
However, anger also reinforces existing attitudes on a topic, as people are more likely to rely 
on heuristics to evaluate information and use sources that validate their pre-existing beliefs 
(Parker & Isbell, 2010). With respect to COVID-19, a recent study found that anger increases 
the rate at which people accept and disseminate false information about COVID-19 online 
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(Han et al., 2020). Further, Jolley and Paterson (2020) found that belief in conspiracy theories 
about the role of 5G networks in the spread of COVID-19 predicted higher levels of anger, 
which in turn led to justification and support for violence towards 5G technology.  
In the context of evaluating government restrictions and compliance, anger could be 
relevant for individuals who believe in virus-as-a-hoax theories. Such individuals should 
perceive the restrictive government guidelines (e.g., forceful lockdowns, social distancing 
measures) as unfair and unjustified. As injustice is a reliable trigger of anger, the restrictive 
policies would likely become the target of protest behaviour and personal noncompliance. 
Importantly, however, past research found that specific, mutually incompatible conspiracy 
beliefs are often endorsed by the same individual (Goertzel, 1994; Wood et al., 2012). In the 
aforementioned research by Imhoff and Lamberty (2020) for example, beliefs in the 
bioweapon and hoax theories were strongly and positively correlated. Thus, we hypothesised 
that COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs in general – not solely hoax beliefs – would be linked with 
higher levels of anger, which in turn would relate to perceptions of the government health 
guidelines as less important, and ultimately to lower personal compliance with these 
guidelines. 
Anxiety 
Whereas anger leads to approach behaviours, the emotional response of anxiety is 
defined as a negative and arousing but experiential avoidance emotion. Anxiety is linked to 
cautious information processing and behaviour to avoid dangerous and harmful consequences 
(Friman et al., 1998). It reflects “a state of helplessness, because of a perceived inability to 
predict, control, or obtain desired results or outcomes in certain upcoming personally salient 
situations or contexts” (Barlow, 2000, p. 1248). Conspiracy beliefs imply that authorities 
behave in nefarious ways and are responsible for negative events which are beyond the 
control of the ordinary individual. As such, it is not surprising that conspiracy beliefs are 
commonly linked to higher levels of anxiety (Douglas et al., 2017). Feelings of anxiety 
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elicited by conspiracy theories can lead to different withdrawal behaviours, which usually aim 
“to avoid the suspected conspiracy” (van Prooijen & van Vugt, 2018, p. 776). For example, 
Jolley and Douglas (2014) found that exposure to climate change conspiracies increased 
levels of uncertainty, which in turn led to lower action intentions to reduce one’s carbon 
footprint.  
Research on COVID-19 conspiracy theories has also demonstrated that levels of 
anxiety, or the lack thereof, relate to health behaviours. In this context, heightened anxiety 
was associated with greater hoarding behaviour (Jovančević & Milićević, 2020) and generally 
greater prepping behaviour (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2020), but also greater adherence to self-
protective health behaviours, even those not mandatory (Marinthe et al., 2020). We therefore 
hypothesised that COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs would also be linked with higher levels of 
anxiety, which in turn would relate to perception of the government health guidelines as more 
important, and ultimately to higher personal compliance with these guidelines. 
Hope 
Lastly, we consider the role of hope. Hope is a positive approach-based emotion that 
reflects the belief that one can find pathways to desired goals and the motivation to use those 
pathways (Snyder et al., 2002). The role of hope has been largely ignored in earlier accounts 
of collective action (Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal, 2006). However, some recent studies have 
identified a positive impact of feelings of hope on, for example, collective action intentions 
(Sabucedo & Vilas, 2014) and collective mobilizations participation (Wlodarczyk et al., 
2017), at least partly through increased perceived efficacy (Páez et al., 2015). Hope is also 
related to the adoption of personal health protective behaviour (Yarcheski et al., 2004) and 
greater behaviour change (Feldman & Sills, 2013).  
Turning to conspiracy beliefs, research has usually found associations between 
conspiracy beliefs and higher levels of negative emotions, as well as lower levels of positive 
emotions (e.g., Tomljenovic et al., 2020; van Prooijen & Douglas, 2017). As stated above, 
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conspiracy beliefs typically imply low personal control in the face of powerful authorities and 
groups who act to the detriment of the individual. Hence, it seems reasonable to expect that 
COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs would coincide with feelings of powerlessness (see Jolley & 
Douglas, 2014) and low levels of hope, especially given the overwhelming (global) scale of 
the alleged conspiracy and the escalating impact on people’s lives. Thus, and finally, we 
hypothesised that COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs would be linked with lower levels of hope, 
undermining the potential beneficial effect of this emotion on perception of government 
health guidelines, and personal compliance with these guidelines. 
Overview and Hypotheses 
In the present research, we investigated the link between belief in conspiracy theories 
(general and COVID-19 related) and support for, as well as compliance with, government 
health policies. We hypothesised that COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs (i.e., beliefs that 
authorities are hiding the truth about the virus) would be related to perceived importance of 
government measures aiming to tackle the spread of the pandemic.  
First, we expected that COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs would be a more relevant 
correlate than general conspiracy beliefs with personal compliance with COVID-19 rules and 
restrictions because evidence shows specific conspiracy theories, just like specific attitudes 
generally (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977), are stronger predictors of specific behaviours (e.g., 
Imhoff & Lamberty, 2020).  
Moreover, in light of previous findings that conspiracy beliefs can translate into 
different reactions and behaviours (Allington et al., 2020; Imhoff & Lamberty, 2020), we 
suggest that the link between COVID-19 conspiracy theories and attitudes towards 
government restrictions and health protective behaviour would be underlay by the 
simultaneous activation of different emotions driving attitudes and behaviours in different 
directions. Greater levels of anger and lower levels of hope would be related to weaker 
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perceptions and behaviours, while greater levels of anxiety would be related to stronger 
perceptions and behaviours. 
To test these hypotheses, we relied on a structural equation model investigating the 
role of anger, anxiety, and hope as potential mediators of the relationship between COVID-19 
conspiracy beliefs and attitudes towards government restrictions and, from there, to self-
reported compliant behaviour (that is, how much participants report having complied with the 
governmental measures themselves over the past week). 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
This investigation took place in a cross-sectional survey conducted the early months 
of the pandemic. The data were part of a large-scale research project aiming to track social 
cohesion in the UK during COVID-19. The survey assessed the views of a panel of 
respondents regarding the current political situation, social cohesion, political views, and 
views on COVID-19. Participants were drawn from the general population of the regions of 
Scotland and Wales as well as the county of Kent in England. These areas were chosen 
because of their disparities in terms of demographics, political preferences, and history – so 
that considering them together would provide a comprehensive overview of citizens’ 
perceptions in the UK. An external research partner (Qualtrics Panels) distributed the online 
survey, recruiting and remunerating the participants directly. The sample was stratified to be 
representative on gender and age categories.i  
Data were collected between 7 and 19 May 2020 while the UK had effectively been 
under its first national lockdown for more than six weeks. To provide some temporal context, 
the first national lockdown in the UK was introduced on 26 March 2020 but number of cases 
and deaths continued to increase for several weeks, with a peak of COVID-19 deaths recorded 
during the third week of April. Cases then started to decline, and on 30 April 2020 the Prime 
Minister declared the country was “past the peak” of the pandemic. During the data collection 
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period (7-19 May 2020), the UK recorded an average of 3,400 deaths per week. A conditional 
plan for lifting lockdown was announced on 10 May 2020 but the first rules were only relaxed 
in June starting with a phase re-opening of schools from 1 June 2020 (Institute for 
Government, 2021).  
A total of 1,579 respondents (50.5% female, Mage = 55.98, SD = 14.78) completed 
the online questionnaire. We determined sample size prior to data collection based on 
feasibility and funding capacities. In addition, the general design of the study, sample size, 
and rules for participants exclusions was preregistered.ii Alongside other measures that are 
part of separate projects, participants completed measures for conspiracy beliefs, emotions, 
perceived importance of government restrictions, and self-reported compliance with 
government restrictions. Participants also reported their political orientation (1 = Left, 7 = 
Right, M = 4.03, SD = 1.36), and whether they had personally been exposed to COVID-19.iii 
Due to length constraints, most constructs were measured with one or two items. Unless 
specified otherwise, all items were measured on 5-point scales (1 = Not at all, 5 = Extremely). 
Zero-order correlations between all items are reported in Table 1. Data is publicly available 
on the OSF page dedicated to the project: [link]. 
Materials 
General Conspiracy Beliefs 
General conspiracy beliefs were measured with a single item scale developed and 
validated by Lantian et al. (2016). As a preamble, participants read, “Some people suggest 
that the ‘official version’ of events such as the 9/11 attacks or the death of Princess Diana, 
could be an attempt to hide the truth from the public. This ‘official version’ could mask the 
fact that these events have been planned and secretly prepared by a covert alliance of 
powerful individuals or organizations (for example secret services or government). What do 
you think?”, followed by the question: “I think that the official version of the events given by 
the authorities very often hides the truth” (7-point scale ranging from 1 = Completely false to 
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7 = Completely true; M = 4.63, SD = 1.62). 21.3% of respondents ticked the statement as false 
or completely false, 19.0% were neutral, and 59.7% ticked it as true or completely true 
(although most participants were more nuanced and only 12.6% considered the statement to 
be completely true).  
COVID-19 Conspiracy Beliefs 
We then asked respondents about potential suspicions about the authorities’ account of 
the pandemic with the following item, “I think that the official version of the COVID-19 
pandemic given by the authorities hides the truth” (similar 7-point scale; M = 4.56, SD = 
1.72).iv Not unlike the previous item, 24.7% of respondents ticked the statement as false or 
completely false, 17.9% were neutral, and 57.3% ticked it as true or completely true (although 
only 13.7% considered the statement to be completely true). 
Emotions: Anger, Anxiety and Hope 
Participants reported to what extent they were experiencing different emotions when 
reflecting on the current global situation during the pandemic: “Thinking about the current 
situation in the UK, how do you feel about the way the future looks for people in the UK?” 
Pairs of items were aggregated to represent anger (“angry”, “resentful”, M = 2.32, SD = 1.12, 
α = .79) and hope (“hopeful”, “confident”, M = 2.49, SD = 0.98, α = .78) while a single item 
measured anxiety (“anxious”, M = 3.17, SD = 1.21). 
Perceived Importance of Government Restrictions 
Two items measured the perceived importance of governmental restrictions aiming to 
limit the spread of the virus: “How important do you think it is that you respect these 
restrictions?” and “How important do you think it is that everyone respects the restrictions 
enacted by the government?”, and were aggregated (M = 4.58, SD = 0.65, α = .79). 
Self-Reported Compliant Behaviour 
Finally, participants self-reported their own compliant behaviour with respect to these 
restrictions: “In all honesty, if you think about your behaviour this past week, how much 
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would you say you respected the government rules about restrictions on movement and 
distancing?” (M = 4.45, SD = 0.74). 
 
Table 1. Zero-order correlations between all measures. 
  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 General conspiracy beliefs .74*** -.12*** .03 .22*** .12*** -.12*** -.06* -.03 
2 COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs  -.15
*** .02 .32*** .17*** -.17*** -.11*** -.08** 
3 Political orientation   -.04 -.21*** -.13*** .28*** .00 .01 
4 Personal exposure to the virus    .13
*** .15*** -.07** .03 .02 
5 Anger     .46*** -.24*** -.06* -.06* 
6 Anxiety      -.24*** .13*** .08** 
7 Hope       .05* -.02 
8 Perceived importance of restrictions        .61
*** 
9 Compliant behaviour         
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 
 
Results 
General versus COVID-19 Related Conspiracy Beliefs 
We first conducted regression analyses to test the relationships between conspiracy 
beliefs and perceived importance of government restrictions as well as compliant behaviour 
(while controlling for demographics, political orientation as well as personal exposure to 
COVID-19) with the aim of directly comparing the role of general conspiracy beliefs and 
COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs. It can already be noted that including the covariates in the 
models did not influence the findings.v Consistent with expectations, results showed that only 
COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs was related with both perceived importance of government 
restrictions and self-reported compliant behaviour, while general conspiracy beliefs were not 
once other effects had been taken into account (Table 2). 
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Table 2. Results of the regression models testing the relationships between general and COVID-19 related conspiracy beliefs on perceived 
importance of governmental restrictions and self-reported compliant behaviour, controlling for demographics, political orientation and personal 
exposure to COVID-19. 
 Perceived importance of governmental restrictions Compliant behaviour 
 b (SE) 95% CI t-test p-value b (SE) 95% CI t-test p-value 
Intercept 4.38 (.068) [4.24, 4.51] 64.26 <.001 4.24 (.077) [4.05, 4.39] 55.25 <.001 
Age .003 (.001) [.001, .006] 3.19 .001 .003 (.001) [.001, .007] 2.95 .003 
Gender .05 (.017) [.019, .086] 3.05 .002 .05 (.019) [.010, .086] 2.50 .012 
Political 
orientation -.02 (.017) [-.051, .015] -1.10 .27 -.01 (.019) [-.047, .027] -0.52 .60 
Personal exposure .02 (.017) [-.010, .056] 1.38 .17 .02 (.019) [-.019, .054] 0.93 .35 
Conspiracy beliefs: 
General .01 (.025) [-.038, .059] 0.42 .67 .04 (.028) [-.019, .091] 1.29 .20 
Conspiracy beliefs: 
COVID-19 -.08 (.025) [-.127, -.029] -3.12 .002 -.08 (.028) [-.136, -.026] -2.87 .004 
 F(6, 1523) = 5.87, p < .001, R2adj = .02 F(6, 1523) = 3.87, p = .001, R2adj = .01 
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Emotions as Mediators of COVID-19 Conspiracy Beliefs 
We then conducted a structural equation model testing the mediating role of 
emotions between COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs and perceived importance of restrictions, as 
well as the link from perceived importance to personal compliance with the restrictions. 
Following recommendations by Yzerbyt et al. (2018), we ran a joint-significance test to 
examine the component paths, then relied on a bootstrap resampling method to examine the 
magnitude of the indirect effect (percentile bootstrap confidence intervals). Analyses were 
conducted on R with the package lavaan (Rosseel, 2012) and used case-wise (or ‘full 
information’) maximum likelihood estimation, including the measurement model (i.e., 
definition of the latent variables) and the structural model.  
As detailed in Table 3, the model supported our hypotheses, showing a significant 
indirect path from conspiracy beliefs to perceived importance of the restrictions through 
anger, anxiety, and – although not reaching the traditional threshold for statistical significance 
– hope (see Figure 1). The indirect effects through anger and hope were negative (i.e., 
conspiracy beliefs were linked to lesser perceived importance through greater anger and lesser 
hope), while the indirect effect through anxiety was positive (i.e., conspiracy beliefs were 
linked to greater perceived importance through greater anxiety). These variables explained R2 
= .06 of the variance of perceived importance. In turn, perceived importance of the restrictions 
was linked to greater personal compliant behaviour with these restrictions. The overall model 
showed a satisfactory fit, χ2(35) = 301.56, CFI = .940, RMSEA = .069, 90% CI [.062, .077], 
SRMR = .057. 
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Figure 1. Structural equation model testing the relationship between COVID-19 conspiracy 
beliefs and perceived importance of governmental restrictions, mediated by anxiety, anger, 
and hope (controlling for political orientation and personal exposure to the virus). 
 
Notes. The measurement model is not represented in the figure, but estimates are reported in a 
note.vi Values reported above paths are standardised estimates (β). Constructs estimated with a 
single item are treated as observed variables (i.e., no specified measurement error). 
*
 p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Table 3. Results of the structural equation model testing the relationship between COVID-19 
conspiracy beliefs and perceived importance of governmental restrictions, mediated by 
anxiety, anger, and hope. 
 b (SE) 95% CI z-test p-value β 
Regressions      
Conspiracy ~      
 Political orientation -.25 (.043) [-.33, -.16] -5.76 < .001 -.145 
 Personal exposure .03 (.043) [-.05, .12] 0.75 .456 .019 
Anger ~      
  Conspiracy .20 (.016) [.17, .23] 12.22 < .001 .354 
Anxiety ~      
  Conspiracy .12 (.018) [.09, .16] 6.84 < .001 .171 
Hope ~      
  Conspiracy -.10 (.015) [-.13, -.07] -6.64 < .001 -.198 
Perceived importance ~      
  Anger -.10 (.027) [-.15, -.04] -3.57 < .001 -.143 
  Anxiety .14 (.018) [.10, .17] 7.68 < .001 .249 
  Hope .04 (.024) [-.01, .09] 1.76 .078 .058 
  Conspiracy (direct effect) -.04 (.011) [-.06, -.02] -3.45 .001 -.100 
    Indirect effect: Anger -.02 (.005) [-.03, -.01] -3.51 < .001 -.050 
    Indirect effect: Anxiety .02 (.003) [.01, .02] 5.10 < .001 .043 
    Indirect effect: Hope -.004 (.003) [-.01, .001] -1.68 .093 -.011 
    Total effect -.05 (.010) [-.07, -.03] -4.44 < .001 -.119 
Personal behaviour ~      
  Perceived importance .76 (.031) [.70, .82] 24.97 < .001 .678 
Covariances      
Anger ~~ Hope -.20 (.032) [-.26, -.13] -6.12 < .001 -.248 
Anxiety ~~ Hope -.26 (.031) [-.32, -.20] -8.48 < .001 -.251 
Anger ~~ Anxiety .54 (.036) [.47, .61] 14.94 < .001 .497 
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Discussion 
This paper presented the results of a cross-sectional survey investigating the 
relationships between conspiracy beliefs, emotions, and compliance with COVID-19 
governmental restrictions. The research provided support for the hypothesis that specific 
COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs predict conspiracy related attitudes and behaviours more 
accurately than general conspiracy beliefs, illustrating the importance of the context of these 
beliefs.  
Furthermore, this research is one of the few to examine the psychological processes by 
which COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs can contribute to different behavioural outcomes by 
focussing on emotional states that are most relevant for engagement in social action and 
public health behaviour (i.e., anxiety, anger, and hope). As anticipated, COVID-19 conspiracy 
belief-related levels of anger were linked to lower levels of perceived importance of 
government restrictions, while levels of anxiety were linked to greater perceived importance. 
COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs were also linked to lower levels of hope, which then related to 
greater perceived importance of the restrictions, although this effect was much weaker than 
through anger and anxiety and did not reach the threshold for statistical significance. Overall, 
anxiety and anger had significant, opposing, indirect effects on the level of caution amongst 
stronger COVID-19 conspiracy believers, which in turn was associated with more or less law-
abiding containment behaviour, respectively. This suggests that the behavioural correlates of 
conspiracy beliefs might not always be straightforward, and highlights the importance of 
taking into account the different emotional states that can be related to such beliefs. 
Conspiracy Beliefs and Emotions 
The present research might help reconcile past findings showing different effects of 
COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs. For example, varying levels of anxiety and anger possibly 
played a role for Imhoff and Lamberty’s (2020) findings that hoax-beliefs predict lesser 
containment behaviour, whereas bio-weapon beliefs predicted greater prepping behaviour. 
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Similarly, anxiety might have played a role in the link between beliefs that some unindentified 
group is reponsible for COVID-19 and support for xenophobic policies (Oleksy et al., 2021), 
whereas anger could have contributed to the relationship between belief in government-
related theories (i.e., that the government uses the pandemic to restrict individual freedoms) 
and lesser compliance with government guidelines (e.g., Earnshaw et al., 2020). However, the 
current study does not allow to rule out that believers in the same COVID-19 conspiracy 
theory might have different emotional responses, or that conspiracy-related emotions draw on 
additional factors unrelated to theory content. More research is needed to examine whether 
conspiracy theory content is tied to specific emotions. 
Our results also speak more broadly to the underexplored role of emotions in 
conspiracy beliefs and their behavioural outcomes. Given that different emotional states are 
linked to different behavioural tendencies (e.g., anger – confrontation, fear – avoidance), 
investigating the emotional correlates of different conspiracy beliefs could allow researchers 
to draw more nuanced conclusions as to their expected behavioural outcomes. In addition, 
studies that examine the role of emotions but focus either on individual states (e.g., anger 
predicting support for violence, Jolley & Paterson, 2020), or average a variety of emotional 
states into single indicators (e.g., negative emotions predicting anti-vaccination intentions, 
Tomljenovic et al., 2020), also risk missing potential ambiguous effects. Furthermore, a more 
nuanced understanding of the underlying emotional factors connecting conspiracy beliefs and 
a corresponding behaviour might also help tailor and improve potential intervention 
messages, for example aiming to address potential false beliefs before people are exposed to 
conspiracy theories (Jolley & Douglas, 2017). 
Conspiracy Beliefs and Political Orientation 
The results revealed small but significant correlations between conspiracy beliefs 
(both general and COVID-19 related ) and political orientation. As it turned out, suspicion 
towards official health advice from the current (Conservative) UK government was stronger 
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amongst more politically liberal participants. This is a noteworthy finding, given the long-
standing debate as to whether conspiracy theorising is inherently connected with ideological 
predispositions (e.g., Sutton & Douglas, 2020b). Some have shown that susceptibility to 
conspiracy beliefs is higher amongst conservatives (see e.g., Enders & Smallpage, 2019; van 
der Linden et al., 2021), and reactance to COVID-19 government restrictions is predicted by 
various right-wing ideology subfactors (Clarke et al., 2021). Others argue that conspiracy 
beliefs are strongest amongst both extreme ends of the ideological spectrum, expressed to a 
similar extent by extreme right- and left-wing ideologues (van Prooijen et al., 2015). Testing 
for this possibility, the present data showed a quadratic relationship between ideology and 
general conspiracy beliefs, but a linear relationship with COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs. This 
could reflect defiance amongst left-wing British voters towards the current Conservative 
government and their handling of the pandemic, and as such support the idea that conspiracy 
beliefs can be tied to a lack of political power (e.g., Uscinski & Parent, 2014), wherein 
supporters of the opposition are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories targeting the 
incumbant political power. Thus, intergroup processes likely play an important role in the 
COVID-19 pandemic, shaping relations to the authorities, social attitudes, and social 
fragmentation or unity (Abrams et al., 2021; Krings et al., 2021). While it is beyond the scope 
of this paper to discuss this link in greater detail, future research on this topic could help to 
better understand the relationships between ideology, COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs, and 
compliant behaviour. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Some limitations of the present work must be noted. A first is the reliance on self-
report measures, specifically to capture compliant behaviour. Social desirability bias may 
have led respondents to overstate their level of compliance, especially in the context of the 
study (during the first national lockdown) where non-compliance could reflect illegal 
behaviour. In addition, we specifically captured compliance with restrictions about movement 
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and social distancing, which may rely on the respondents’ knowledge of the rules and could 
reflect different behaviours based on the interpretation of the rules (e.g., ‘movement’ between 
regions or between households; social distancing in public or private settings). Furthermore, 
our measure omits other important health measures such as hand washing or mask wearing. 
Future studies could investigate in greater detail what behaviours are influenced by 
conspiracy beliefs and differentiate between categories (e.g., normative vs non-normative 
behaviours; see Imhoff & Lamberty, 2020; Marinthe et al., 2020), or degrees of compliant 
behaviour (e.g., van Rooij et al., 2020). This could further allow researchers to draw more 
nuanced conclusions about the impact of (mis)information on citizen behaviour.  
Second, the reliance on single item measures for key variables (conspiracy beliefs, 
anxiety) is not ideal. We provided some validation that the single item measure of COVID-19 
conspiracy beliefs correlates in an expected manner with other relevant constructsiv. In 
addition, average levels of COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs were similar to those observed in 
other studies with comparable designs (e.g., Oleksy et al., 2020). Nevertheless, it remains 
difficult to establish the predictive validity of single or two-item scales, and measurement 
models remain underidentified (Diamantopoulos et al., 2012). Future studies could ensure that 
constructs are assessed with reliable multi-item measures.  
Third, it must be acknowledged that emotions explained only a relatively small part of 
the relationship between COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs and perception of governmental 
restrictions (i.e., a partial mediation), and had a limited direct effect on behavioural outcomes. 
There are most likely other mediators that further explain this relationship. Future studies 
could broaden the investigation of affective processes and include other emotions (e.g., guilt, 
shame, pride, satisfaction) and investigate whether and to what extent conspiracy beliefs boost 
negative and undermine positive affect. Another avenue of research could investigate other 
psychological mechanisms, such as the fulfillment of social motives (see Douglas et al., 
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2017), further examining how distrust towards official restrictions is related to assignment of 
blame to (political) outgroups. 
Lastly, we note that the relationship between COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs and social 
behaviours is undoubtedly shaped by particular social expectations relevant at the time, and 
thus, is extremely context-bound. Since the beginning of the pandemic in early 2020, the 
amount of available factual information, misinformation, levels of knowledge and personal 
experiences regarding COVID-19 have changed dramatically, along with the waves of impact 
of the virus itself. Our results reflect a snapshot of social attitudes and behaviours among UK 
nationals during the first national lockdown in May 2020. Different results could arise in 
different time and space contexts and future studies could investigate the mediating role of 
emotions in different countries as well as different points of the crisis, as the pandemic 
progresses, as circumstances change (e.g., repeated lockdowns, vaccination rollouts), and as 
different behaviours are expected from people. 
Practical Implications 
As pointed out at the start of this paper, a global pandemic is the ideal breeding ground 
for conspiracy beliefs (Douglas, 2021). The scale of the event, combined with the many 
uncertainties surrounding its origin, progression, current and future impact fed into various, 
often contradictory, conspiracy theories which have been widely shared. Even if the 
prevalence of COVID-19 conspiracy theories in the wider population remains open for debate 
(see e.g., McManus et al., 2020; Sutton & Douglas, 2020a), most people have been exposed to 
such theories one way or another (Mitchell & Oliphant, 2020; Schaeffer, 2020). It is hence 
important to understand better the role of such beliefs and their emotional correlates for 
people’s behaviour as the pandemic progresses. 
Like others (Allington et al., 2020; Earnshaw et al., 2020) we were able to show that 
belief in such theories relates to lower support for, and compliance with the restrictions 
deemed necessary by official authorities to control the spread of the virus. Thus, conspiracy 
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beliefs may further contribute to the progression of the pandemic, which highlights the 
importance of government efforts to contain the spread of misinformation (see also 
Commission for Countering Extremism, 2020). Even when conspiracy beliefs relate to more 
protective behaviour, they do so out of fear and suspicion, which does not seem like an 
adequate strategy to sustain compliance and cohesion in the longer term.  
Further, we show that emotions play an important role in how (mis)information relates 
to attitudes, which highlights the importance of affective processes for attitudes and 
behaviours during the pandemic. Indeed, this has been acknowledged by other scholars. 
Notably, examining the impact of emotions in public messages, Trnka and Lorencova (2020) 
illustrated how pessimistic communication by mass media can amplify negative affect within 
the general public. Authorities have also expressed awareness of how emotional states can 
influence reaction to their own messages. The Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies 
(SAGE), which counsels the British Government, has asserted that both positive and negative 
emotions are important to persuade citizens to adhere to social distancing measures. They 
recommended that government messages aim to simultaneously increase perceptions of threat 
and citizens’ feelings of efficacy, so that individuals would more likely to take the virus 
seriously and engage in a national collective effort to stop the spread when they believe they 
can make a difference (Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies, 2020). In other words, 
they suggest that information about the virus is more effective when it evokes anxiety and 
hope. The present findings suggest that the same psychological processes play a role when it 
comes to COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs, and corroborate the idea that increased perceptions of 
threat – if not too high – can be effective to increase compliant behaviour (Harper et al., 
2020). Whether government messages should, where appropriate, consider addressing 
citizens’ anger to increase compliance remains unclear, as there is no evidence yet linking (the 
lack of) compliant behaviour to anger in the general public (Brouard et al., 2020). 
Conclusions 
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Overall, the present findings show that the attitudinal and behavioural correlates of 
conspiracy beliefs are not straightforwad. These complex relationships are underpinned by 
specific emotional routes, emphasising the need for a more nuanced understanding of 
different theories and their behavioural implications. In addition, general and COVID-19 
related beliefs are not associated with the same outcomes. This indicates the great variability 
in the consequences of having certain conspiracy beliefs and highlight the importance of 
being precise and specific when assessing a person’s beliefs in order to adequately understand 
their behaviour.  
 
Running head: EMOTIONS AND COVID-19 CONSPIRACY BELIEFS 25 
 
References 
Abrams, D., Lalot, F., & Hogg, M. A. (2021). Intergroup and intragroup dimensions of COVID-19: A 
social identity perspective on social fragmentation and unity Group Processes & Intergroup 
Relations, 24(2), 201-209. https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430220983440  
Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. (1977). Attitude-behavior relations: A theoretical analysis and review of 
empirical research. Psychological Bulletin, 84(5), 888-918. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-
2909.84.5.888  
Allington, D., Duffy, B., Wessely, S., Dhavan, N., & Rubin, J. (2020). Health-protective behaviour, 
social media usage and conspiracy belief during the COVID-19 public health emergency. 
Psychological medicine, 1-7. https://doi.org/10.1017/S003329172000224X  
Barlow, D. H. (2000). Unraveling the mysteries of anxiety and its disorders from the perspective of 
emotion theory. American Psychologist, 55(11), 1247-1263. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-
066X.55.11.1247  
Beer, T. (2020). Trump baselessly accuses doctors of overreporting Covid deaths for financial gain. 
Forbes. Retrieved 30.10.2020 from 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tommybeer/2020/10/30/trump-baslessly-accuses-doctors-of-
overreporting-covid-deaths-for-financial-gain/?sh=49ad1d6e7547  
Bertin, P., Nera, K., & Delouvée, S. (2020). Conspiracy beliefs, rejection of vaccination, and support 
for hydroxychloroquine: A conceptual replication-extension in the COVID-19 pandemic 
context. Frontiers in Psychology, 11(2471). https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.565128  
Biddlestone, M., Green, R., & Douglas, K. M. (2020). Cultural orientation, power, belief in 
conspiracy theories, and intentions to reduce the spread of COVID-19. British Journal of 
Social Psychology, 59(3), 663-673. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12397  
Bierwiaczonek, K., Kunst, J. R., & Pich, O. (2020). Belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories reduces 
social distancing over time. Applied Psychology: Health and Well-Being, 12(4), 1270-1285. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/aphw.12223  
Brouard, S., Vasilopoulos, P., & Becher, M. (2020). Sociodemographic and psychological correlates 
of compliance with the COVID-19 public health measures in France. Canadian Journal of 
Political Science. Revue Canadienne De Science Politique, 1-6. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423920000335  
Bruder, M., Haffke, P., Neave, N., Nouripanah, N., & Imhoff, R. (2013). Measuring individual 
differences in generic beliefs in conspiracy theories across cultures: Conspiracy Mentality 
Questionnaire. Frontiers in Psychology, 4(225). https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00225  
Chaiken, S., Liberman, A., & Eagly, A. H. (1989). Heuristic and systematic information processing 
within and beyond the persuasion context. In J. S. Uleman, J. A. Bargh, J. S. Uleman, & J. A. 
Bargh (Eds.), Unintended thought. (pp. 212-252). Guilford Press. 




Clarke, E. J. R., Klas, A., & Dyos, E. (2021). The role of ideological attitudes in responses to COVID-
19 threat and government restrictions in Australia. Personality and individual differences, 
175, 110734-110734. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2021.110734  
Commission for Countering Extremism. (2020). COVID-19: How hateful extremists are exploiting the 
pandemic. UK Government. Retrieved 09.07.2020 from 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/906724/CCE_Briefing_Note_001.pdf  
Diamantopoulos, A., Sarstedt, M., Fuchs, C., Wilczynski, P., & Kaiser, S. (2012). Guidelines for 
choosing between multi-item and single-item scales for construct measurement: a predictive 
validity perspective. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 40(3), 434-449. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11747-011-0300-3  
Douglas, K. M. (2021). COVID-19 conspiracy theories. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 
24(2), 270-275. https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430220982068  
Douglas, K. M., Sutton, R. M., & Cichocka, A. (2017). The psychology of conspiracy theories. 
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 26(6), 538-542. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721417718261  
Drouvelis, M., & Grosskopf, B. (2016). The effects of induced emotions on pro-social behaviour. 
Journal of Public Economics, 134, 1-8. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.12.012  
Earnshaw, V. A., Eaton, L. A., Kalichman, S. C., Brousseau, N. M., Hill, E. C., & Fox, A. B. (2020). 
COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs, health behaviors, and policy support. Translational Behavioral 
Medicine, 10(4), 850-856. https://doi.org/10.1093/tbm/ibaa090  
Enders, A. M., & Smallpage, S. M. (2019). Informational Cues, Partisan-Motivated Reasoning, and 
the Manipulation of Conspiracy Beliefs. Political Communication, 36(1), 83-102. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2018.1493006  
Feldman, D. B., & Sills, J. R. (2013). Hope and cardiovascular health-promoting behaviour: 
Education alone is not enough. Psychology & Health, 28(7), 727-745. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/08870446.2012.754025  
Fornaro, L., & Wolf, M. (2020). Covid-19 Coronavirus and macroeconomic policy (Working Papers, 
Issue. https://ideas.repec.org/p/bge/wpaper/1168.html  
Friman, P. C., Hayes, S. C., & Wilson, K. G. (1998). Why behavior analysts should study emotion: 
The example of anxiety. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 31(1), 137-156. 
https://doi.org/10.1901/jaba.1998.31-137  
Goertzel, T. (1994). Belief in conspiracy theories. Political Psychology, 15(4), 731-742. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/3791630  
Running head: EMOTIONS AND COVID-19 CONSPIRACY BELIEFS 27 
 
Han, J., Cha, M., & Lee, W. (2020). Anger contributes to the spread of COVID-19 misinformation. 
The Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review, 1(3), 1-15. 
https://doi.org/10.37016/mr-2020-39  
Harper, C. A., Satchell, L. P., Fido, D., & Latzman, R. D. (2020). Functional fear predicts public 
health compliance in the COVID-19 pandemic. International Journal of Mental Health and 
Addiction, 1-14. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11469-020-00281-5  
Imhoff, R., & Lamberty, P. (2020). A Bioweapon or a hoax? The link between distinct conspiracy 
beliefs about the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak and pandemic behavior. Social 
Psychological and Personality Science, 11(8), 1110-1118. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550620934692  
Institute for Government. (2021). Timeline of UK coronavirus lockdowns, March 2020 to March 
2021. Institute for Government. Retrieved April 2021 from 
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/timeline-lockdown-web.pdf  
Islam, N., Sharp, S. J., Chowell, G., Shabnam, S., Kawachi, I., Lacey, B., Massaro, J. M., D’Agostino, 
R. B., & White, M. (2020). Physical distancing interventions and incidence of coronavirus 
disease 2019: natural experiment in 149 countries. BMJ, 370, m2743. 
https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.m2743  
Jarymowicz, M., & Bar-Tal, D. (2006). The dominance of fear over hope in the life of individuals and 
collectives. European Journal of Social Psychology, 36(3), 367-392. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.302  
Jolley, D., & Douglas, K. M. (2014). The social consequences of conspiracism: Exposure to 
conspiracy theories decreases intentions to engage in politics and to reduce one's carbon 
footprint. British Journal of Psychology, 105(1), 35-56. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjop.12018  
Jolley, D., & Douglas, K. M. (2017). Prevention is better than cure: Addressing anti‐vaccine 
conspiracy theories. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 47(8), 459-469. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/jasp.12453  
Jolley, D., & Paterson, J. L. (2020). Pylons ablaze: Examining the role of 5G COVID-19 conspiracy 
beliefs and support for violence. British Journal of Social Psychology, 59(3), 628-640. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12394  
Jovančević, A., & Milićević, N. (2020). Optimism-pessimism, conspiracy theories and general trust as 
factors contributing to COVID-19 related behavior - A cross-cultural study. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 167, 110216-110216. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2020.110216  
Konijn, E. A. (2013). The role of emotion in media use and effects. In The Oxford Handbook of 
Media Psychology (pp. 186-211). Oxford University Press. 
Krings, V. C., Steeden, B., Abrams, D., & Hogg, M. A. (2021). Social attitudes and behavior in the 
COVID-19 pandemic: Evidence and prospects from research on group processes and 
Running head: EMOTIONS AND COVID-19 CONSPIRACY BELIEFS 28 
 
intergroup relations. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 24(2), 201-209. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430220986673  
Lalot, F., Heering, M. S., Rullo, M., Travaglino, G. A., & Abrams, D. (2021). The dangers of 
distrustful complacency: Low concern and low political trust combine to undermine 
compliance with governmental restrictions in the emerging COVID-19 pandemic. Group 
Processes & Intergroup Relations, OnlineFirst. https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430220967986  
Lambert, A. J., Eadeh, F. R., & Hanson, E. J. (2019). Chapter Three - Anger and its consequences for 
judgment and behavior: Recent developments in social and political psychology. In J. M. 
Olson (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 59, pp. 103-173). Academic 
Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.aesp.2018.12.001  
Lantian, A., Muller, D., Nurra, C., & Douglas, K. M. (2016). Measuring belief in conspiracy theories: 
Validation of a French and English single-item scale. International Review of Social 
Psychology, 29(1), 1-14. https://doi.org/10.5334/irsp.8  
Leman, P. J., & Cinnirella, M. (2007). A major event has a major cause: Evidence for the role of 
heuristics in reasoning about conspiracy theories. Social Psychological Review, 9, 18-28. 
Marcus, G. E. (2003). The psychology of emotion and politics. In Oxford Handbook of Political 
Psychology (pp. 182-221). Oxford University Press. 
Marinthe, G., Brown, G., Delouvée, S., & Jolley, D. (2020). Looking out for myself: Exploring the 
relationship between conspiracy mentality, perceived personal risk, and COVID-19 
prevention measures. British Journal of Health Psychology, 25(4), 957-980. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/bjhp.12449  
McManus, S., D'Ardenne, J., & Wessely, S. (2020). Covid conspiracies: misleading evidence can be 
more damaging than no evidence at all. Psychological Medicine, 1-2. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291720002184  
Mitchell, A., & Oliphant, J. B. (2020). Americans Immersed in COVID-19 News; Most Think Media 
Are Doing Fairly Well Covering It. Pew Research Center. Retrieved 18.03.2020 from 
https://www.journalism.org/2020/03/18/americans-immersed-in-covid-19-news-most-think-
media-are-doing-fairly-well-covering-it  
Nagy, M. S. (2002). Using a single-item approach to measure facet job satisfaction. Journal of 
Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 75(1), 77-86. 
https://doi.org/10.1348/096317902167658  
Oleksy, T., Wnuk, A., Maison, D., & Łyś, A. (2021). Content matters. Different predictors and social 
consequences of general and government-related conspiracy theories on COVID-19. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 168, 110289-110289. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2020.110289  
Running head: EMOTIONS AND COVID-19 CONSPIRACY BELIEFS 29 
 
Páez, D., Rimé, B., Basabe, N., Wlodarczyk, A., & Zumeta, L. (2015). Psychosocial effects of 
perceived emotional synchrony in collective gatherings. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 108(5), 711-729. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000014  
Parker, M. T., & Isbell, L. M. (2010). How I vote depends on how I feel: The differential impact of 
anger and fear on political information processing. Psychological Science, 21(4), 548-550. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797610364006  
Pavela Banai, I., Banai, B., & Mikloušić, I. (2020). Beliefs in COVID-19 conspiracy theories predict 
lower level of compliance with the preventive measures both directly and indirectly by 
lowering trust in government medical officials. PsyArXiv Preprints. 
https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/yevq7  
Plohl, N., & Musil, B. (2021). Modeling compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines: the 
critical role of trust in science. Psychology, Health & Medicine, 26(1), 1-12. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13548506.2020.1772988  
Rosseel, Y. (2012). Lavaan: An R package for Structural Equation Modeling. Journal of Statistical 
Software, 48(2), 1-36. https://doi.org/http://www.jstatsoft.org/v48/i02/  
Rutjens, B. T., van der Linden, S., & van der Lee, R. (2021). Science skepticism in times of COVID-
19. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 24(2), 276-283. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430220981415  
Sabucedo, J. M., & Vilas, X. (2014). Anger and positive emotions in political protest. Universitas 
Psychologica, 13(3), 829-838. https://doi.org/10.11144/Javeriana.UPSY13-3.apep  
Schaeffer, K. (2020). A look at the Americans who believe there is some truth to the conspiracy theory 
that COVID-19 was planned. Pew Research Center. Retrieved 24.07.2020 from 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/07/24/a-look-at-the-americans-who-believe-
there-is-some-truth-to-the-conspiracy-theory-that-covid-19-was-planned/  
Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies. (2020). Options for increasing adherence to social 
distancing measures. UK Government. Retrieved 22.03.2020 from 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/887467/25-options-for-increasing-adherence-to-social-distancing-measures-22032020.pdf  
Simonsohn, U. (2018). Two Lines: A valid alternative to the invalid testing of U-shaped relationships 
with quadratic regressions. Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science, 
1(4), 538-555. https://doi.org/10.1177/2515245918805755  
Snyder, C. R., Rand, K. L., & Sigmon, D. R. (2002). Hope theory: A member of the positive 
psychology family. In C. R. Snyder & S. J. Lopez (Eds.), Handbook of positive psychology 
(pp. 257-276). Oxford University Press. 
Sohrabi, C., Alsafi, Z., O'Neill, N., Khan, M., Kerwan, A., Al-Jabir, A., Iosifidis, C., & Agha, R. 
(2020). World Health Organization declares global emergency: A review of the 2019 novel 
Running head: EMOTIONS AND COVID-19 CONSPIRACY BELIEFS 30 
 
coronavirus (COVID-19). International Journal of Surgery, 76, 71-76. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijsu.2020.02.034  
Spring, M. (2020). The casualties of this year's viral conspiracy theories. BBC News. Retrieved 
26.12.2020 from https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-55355911  
Sutton, R. M., & Douglas, K. M. (2020a). Agreeing to disagree: reports of the popularity of Covid-19 
conspiracy theories are greatly exaggerated. Psychological Medicine, 1-3. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291720002780  
Sutton, R. M., & Douglas, K. M. (2020b). Conspiracy theories and the conspiracy mindset: 
implications for political ideology. Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences, 34, 118-122. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2020.02.015  
Tomljenovic, H., Bubic, A., & Erceg, N. (2020). It just doesn’t feel right – the relevance of emotions 
and intuition for parental vaccine conspiracy beliefs and vaccination uptake. Psychology & 
Health, 35(5), 538-554. https://doi.org/10.1080/08870446.2019.1673894  
Trnka, R., & Lorencova, R. (2020). Fear, anger, and media-induced trauma during the outbreak of 
COVID-19 in the Czech Republic. Psychological Trauma: Theory, Research, Practice, and 
Policy, 12(5), 546-549. https://doi.org/10.1037/tra0000675  
Uscinski, J. E., & Parent, J. M. (2014). Conspiracy theories are for losers. In J. E. Uscinski & J. M. 
Parent (Eds.), American Conspiracy Theories. Oxford Scholarship Online. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199351800.001.0001  
Van Bavel, J. J., Baicker, K., Boggio, P. S., Capraro, V., Cichocka, A., Cikara, M., Crockett, M. J., 
Crum, A. J., Douglas, K. M., Druckman, J. N., Drury, J., Dube, O., Ellemers, N., Finkel, E. J., 
[…] & Willer, R. (2020). Using social and behavioural science to support COVID-19 
pandemic response. Nature Human Behaviour, 4(5), 460-471. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-
020-0884-z  
van der Linden, S., Panagopoulos, C., Azevedo, F., & Jost, J. T. (2021). The Paranoid style in 
American politics revisited: An Ideological asymmetry in conspiratorial thinking. Political 
Psychology, 42(1), 23-51. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12681  
van Prooijen, J.-W., & Douglas, K. M. (2017). Conspiracy theories as part of history: The role of 
societal crisis situations. Memory Studies, 10(3), 323-333. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698017701615  
van Prooijen, J.-W., Krouwel, A. P. M., & Pollet, T. V. (2015). Political extremism predicts belief in 
conspiracy theories. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 6(5), 570-578. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550614567356  
van Prooijen, J.-W., & van Vugt, M. (2018). Conspiracy theories: Evolved functions and 
psychological mechanisms. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 13(6), 770-788. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691618774270  
Running head: EMOTIONS AND COVID-19 CONSPIRACY BELIEFS 31 
 
van Rooij, B., de Bruijn, A. L., Reinders Folmer, C., Kooistra, E., Kuiper, M. E., Brownlee, M., 
Olthuis, E., & Fine, A. (2020). Compliance with COVID-19 mitigation measures in the 
United States. PsyArXiv Preprints. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/qymu3  
van Zomeren, M. (2013). Four core social-psychological motivations to undertake collective action. 
Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 7(6), 378-388. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12031  
Wirth, W., & Schramm, H. (2005). Media and Emotions. Communication Research Trends, 24(3), 3-
39. 
Witte, K., & Allen, M. (2000). A meta-analysis of fear appeals: implications for effective public 
health campaigns. Health Education & Behavior, 27(5), 591-615. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/109019810002700506  
Wlodarczyk, A., Basabe, N., Páez, D., & Zumeta, L. (2017). Hope and anger as mediators between 
collective action frames and participation in collective mobilization: The case of 15-M. 
Journal of Social and Political Psychology, 5(1), 200-223. 
https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v5i1.471  
Wood, M. J., Douglas, K. M., & Sutton, R. M. (2012). Dead and alive: Beliefs in contradictory 
conspiracy theories. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 3(6), 767-773. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550611434786  
World Health Organization. (2021). WHO calls for further studies, data on origin of SARS-CoV-2 
virus, reiterates that all hypotheses remain open. Retrieved March 30th 2021 from 
https://www.who.int/news/item/30-03-2021-who-calls-for-further-studies-data-on-origin-of-
sars-cov-2-virus-reiterates-that-all-hypotheses-remain-open  
Yarcheski, A., Mahon, N. E., Yarcheski, T. J., & Cannella, B. L. (2004). A Meta-analysis of 
predictors of positive health practices. Journal of Nursing Scholarship, 36(2), 102-108. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1547-5069.2004.04021.x  
Yzerbyt, V., Muller, D., Batailler, C., & Judd, C. M. (2018). New recommendations for testing 
indirect effects in mediational models: The need to report and test component paths. Journal 









i Comparisons with the 2011 UK Census data showed the sample was representative in terms 
of gender quotas. Age-wise, the youngest category (18-24) was underrepresented (2.5% of 
the sample versus 11.9% of the general adult population), while older adults (55-64 and 65-
74) were overrepresented (25.4% versus 14.9%, and 29.0% versus 11.0%, respectively). 
Other age categories were adequately represented. Although not included as a quota, ethnicity 
was also fairly represented in the sample with 96.9% of White/White British respondents 
(corresponding to the Census reports of 96.0% White ethnicity in Scotland, 95.6% in Wales, 
and 93.7% in Kent).  
ii Specifically, we aimed to recruit n = 500 participants in each of the three regions surveyed, 
i.e., N = 1,500. Participants who failed to answer correctly to an attention check, and 
participants who completed the questionnaire in too short a time, were excluded from the 
sample. Exclusions were handled by our partner Qualtrics Panel who determined the criteria 
for "too quick answers" based on the times distribution of the first dozens of participants. 
Exclusions were made on a rolling basis so that the final sample size matched the expected 
minimum of 1,500. Preregistrations for the three regions are accessible at: 
https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=xy7bv7 (first region), 
https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=uz5g9v (second region), and 
https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=ic9xh7 (third region).  
iii Personal exposure to COVID-19 was considered as the sum score of three indicators: 
whether the participant had personally contracted the virus, whether someone close to them 
had contracted the virus, and whether they had personally been seriously affected by COVID-
19 (0 = No, 1 = Not sure, 2 = Yes) – resulting in a summed score ranging 0 to 6 (M = 1.31, 
SD = 1.45). 
iv It was beyond the scope of the present paper to formally validate the items used to measure 
conspiracy beliefs, as the first item was drawn verbatim from previous research and the 
second was built on the exact same sentence structure. However, we are able to present some 
convergent evidence that the two conspiracy beliefs items behave as in previous research. 
Specifically, we investigated correlations with a measure of general trust as Lantian and 
colleagues (2016) did. We similarly found a significant negative correlation with trust, 
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respectively with general conspiracy beliefs, r(1544) = -.16, p < .001, with COVID-19 
conspiracy beliefs, r(1544) = -.21, p < .001 (Lantian found a correlation of r = -.27). We also 
tested correlations with perceived socio-political control, as Bruder et al. (2013) found a 
negative relation between control and conspiracy beliefs (r = -.22). In the present data we 
similarly observed negative correlations between socio-political control and both general, 
r(1544) = -.33, p < .001, and COVID-19, r(1544) = -.32, p < .001, conspiracy beliefs. Hence, 
we are confident the single-item measures can be considered reliable indicators of conspiracy 
beliefs.  
v Although not the central purpose of the present paper, we additionally explored the 
relationships between political orientation and conspiracy beliefs. Previous work has both 
argued that conspiracy beliefs are more common amongst Conservatives who hold a more 
‘paranoid’ style of thinking, and that conspiracy beliefs are more common amongst the 
extreme ends of the political spectrum, both right- and left-wing. We hence tested for both 
linear and quadratic relations between political orientation and conspiracy beliefs. For general 
conspiracy beliefs, results showed both a linear, b = -.18, SE = .041, t(1537) = -4.47, p 
< .001, and quadratic effect of political orientation, b = .06, SE = .029, t(1537) = 2.21, p 
= .027, supporting the idea of greater conspiracy beliefs amongst the extremes. For COVID-
19 conspiracy beliefs, however, only the linear effect was significant, b = -.25, SE = .044, 
t(1537) = -5.69, p < .001, indicating stronger beliefs amongst the more left-wing oriented 
(quadratic effect: b = .01, SE = .031, t(1537) = 0.23, p = .82).  
vi All items loaded significantly on their theoretical latent variables. Specifically, for anger: 
“angry”, b = 1.00, β = .79, “resentful”, b = 1.05, SE = .047, z = 22.45, p < .001, β = .83; for 
hope: “hopeful”, b = 1.00, β = .80, “confident”: b = .95, SE = .087, z = 10.96, p < .001, β 
= .79. For perceived importance of restrictions, “importance for self”: b = 1.00, β = .93, 
“importance for everyone”: b = .79, SE = .031, z = 25.64, p < .001, β = .71. 
